May 22, 2007
THE SURGE - HERE TO HELP
The BBC’s Mark Urban And The Independent’s Adrian Hamilton
On Iraq
On the May 14 edition of Newsnight, the BBC’s Mark Urban reported
from Iraq that the US troop "surge" was an attempt to "turn
the tide of violence" in Baghdad. Urban did not mean it was an attempt
to turn the tide of violence in America’s favour and against its enemies
- the media essentially never present the war in terms of conquest and resistance.
The Americans are fighting for ‘security‘, ’stability’
and ‘peace’, not victory.
Urban made his opinion clear, referring to "Baghdad's sectarian nightmare"
and to the "American struggle to stop its [Baghdad's] descent into
mayhem". If America were fighting for its own version of victory, rather
than peace, it would have to be charged with causing, not resisting, “mayhem”
- but this was not Urban’s argument. Hence the following observation:
“Clearly a lot of people are supporting the insurgents. And that’s
really the essence of all this - whether the Americans, with all their
concerns for their own safety when they go into such dangerous neighbourhoods,
can actually communicate the message that they’re here to help,
and that they +can+ turn the tide in one of these really violent districts
of the city.” (Urban, ‘Embedded with US surge troops,‘
Newsnight; http://news.bbc.co.uk/player/nol/
newsid_6650000/newsid_6655700/6655705.stm? bw=bb&mp=rm)
This depiction of the American army as a peacekeeping force was presented
after Urban had been driven around Baghdad in an armoured Humvee, “call
sign Hellstorm Seven”. The irony was presumably lost on Urban who
disembarked from “Hellstorm Seven” to conduct a straw poll among
Iraqis: “I asked passers by whether they feel secure.”
An Iraqi trader responded: “The security situation, we are relaxed
about it. We come and open our shops, even though business is down. There
is stability now.”
An American soldier asked another Iraqi: “So you’re happy we’re
here?”
The response: “Oh, very, very, very happy.”
Surprisingly, then, the Iraqis were keen to appear favourably disposed
towards the heavily-armed troops surrounding them and due to return later
that night.
Unlike Urban, the locals are no doubt familiar with the reality expressed
by senior British army commanders in Iraq when they decried the “tragic”
and “awful” American habit of viewing Iraqis "as untermenschen”,
such that “they are not concerned about the Iraqi loss of life”.
(Quoted, Sean Rayment, 'US tactics condemned by British officers,' Daily
Telegraph, April 11, 2004)
As we noted earlier this month, a senior US military investigator described
the view all along the US chain of command: “Iraqi civilian lives
are not as important as US lives, their deaths are just the cost of doing
business...”. (Josh White, ‘Report On Haditha Condemns Marines,’
Washington Post, April 21, 2007)
The American soldiers interviewed by Urban seemed friendly, likeable, if
somewhat embittered. One was shown playing guitar, singing a ballad - Urban
described them as “extraordinarily welcoming”. In a BBC Online
article, he was full of admiration:
“You can marvel at the Americans' can-do spirit, as some British
soldiers do. You can see it in terms of America, the world's hyper power
staring failure in the face and refusing to accept it. But in the sergeant's
case the will to carry on comes from a sense of responsibility towards
the people of Iraq.” (Urban, ‘”Can-do” spirit
of US troops in Baghdad,’ May 17, 2007; http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-1/
hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent /6663513.stm)
Urban was disturbed by the qualities of the men he met:
“From the odd glimpse or overheard remark, I do not doubt that
the second platoon contains the odd bad apple or loud-mouth, but as my
time with them went on I became aware of an uncomfortable feeling.
“When eventually I was able to identify it, I realised my unease
concerned British soldiers, and how they compared with these Americans.
Carlisle, Perez and the rest seem brighter, stronger and more committed.”
(Ibid)
No doubt warriors in the front line have often seemed this way to their
own: “The senators are good men, but the senate is a beast,”
as has long been observed. It is close to unforgivable for reporters to
fail to make the distinction, as Urban so patently did. This failure being
the predictable first casualty of embedded journalism, as the military well
know.
In his online article, Urban pondered a conundrum:
“If they are that good, you might ask, why are they not getting
better results in Baghdad? There is history, of course, of terrible past
mistakes. There are numbers: Baghdad is a city of six million. There is
also ruthless intimidation by al-Qaeda of local people and the simple
prejudice of those who will never like the Americans because they are
unbelievers.” (Ibid)
As ever in mainstream journalism, our side merely makes “mistakes”,
while the ‘bad guys’ mete out “ruthless intimidation”.
The problem centres on the West’s favourite bogeymen, “al Qaeda”,
not Iraqi resistance fighters waging war on a brutal occupation. Local people
are being intimidated by these monsters, we are told, although a September
2006 World Public Opinion (WPO) poll found that 61 per cent of Shia and
92 per cent of Sunni approved of attacks on US forces, while 78 per cent
of Iraqis (including 82% Shia and 97% Sunni) believed the US presence was
“provoking more conflict than it is preventing”. (‘The
Iraqi Public on the US Presence and the Future of Iraq,’ September
27, 2006; www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/sep06/
Iraq_Sep06_rpt.pdf)
Compare Urban’s version with the Iraq Study Group Report published
last December:
“Most attacks on Americans still come from the Sunni Arab insurgency.
The insurgency comprises former elements of the Saddam Hussein regime,
disaffected Sunni Arab Iraqis, and common criminals. It has significant
support within the Sunni Arab community... Al Qaeda is responsible for
a small portion of the violence in Iraq, but that includes some of the
more spectacular acts: suicide attacks, large truck bombs, and attacks
on significant religious or political targets.” (The Iraq Study
Group Report, December 6, 2006; http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_report/
report/1206/iraq_study_group_report.pdf)
Intimidation and irrational hatred of “unbelievers“ aside,
another possibility springs to mind - could it be that Iraqis have a problem
with being illegally invaded by a superpower army sent by an American administration
packed to the gills with former oil executives?
John Pilger puts Urban’s film in perspective:
"The US government, together with the British government, have brought
bloodshed on a scale unimagined to Iraq. The so-called civil war is a
direct result of an illegal, rapacious invasion carried out by these two
governments on the basis of demonstrable lies. That is not opinion; that
is a fact -- a fact recognised, it is fair to say, by most of humanity.
Mark Urban's deeply embedded, nineteenth century view of the benign intentions
of the invaders is laughable in the blackest, most profane sense."
(Pilger, email to Media Lens, May 18, 2007)
Ulterior Aims - The Pickles And Lettuce Conspiracy
Most insidiously, journalists of the ‘liberal’ press are obscuring
the truth even while bewailing the mendacity of others. Thus the Independent’s
comment editor, Adrian Hamilton, recently wrote an article dramatically
titled, ‘A desperate attempt to rewrite history’. Hamilton commented:
“The latest attempt to rewrite history comes from Geoff Hoon who
was Defence Secretary at the time of the Iraq invasion... Anyway he's
now popping up to explain that, yes, there were some damaging errors made
in the aftermath of the invasion, but that he and Tony Blair had advised
the US administration strongly against the two worst mistakes - the decisions
to disband the Iraqi army and to de-Baathify the ministries.” (Hamilton,
‘A desperate attempt to rewrite history,’ The Independent,
May 3, 2007; http://comment.independent.co.uk/
columnists_a_l/adrian_hamilton/article2504610.ece)
The ugliest aspect of this blame shifting, Hamilton observed, “is
that it is all there to avoid the central question of whether we were right
to invade Iraq in the first place”. The incompetence and indifference
afflicting that “mistake” were staggering and rooted in the
same ugly truth:
“We didn't go to war for the sake of the Iraqi people. We went
to war to change a regime. The Americans wanted it as the first move in
reshaping the Middle East. Tony Blair wanted it because he fancied himself
as the toppler of a tyrant.”
The motivation “was to do with ulterior aims bought at the cost of
hundreds of thousands of innocent civilian lives".
Amazingly, nowhere in his article did Hamilton feel inclined to spell out
the “ulterior aims” guiding the US in “reshaping the Middle
East”. Noam Chomsky has commented:
"The party line we have to rigidly adhere to says you're not allowed
to talk about the reasons for invading Iraq. We're supposed to believe
that the US would've invaded Iraq if it was an island in the Indian Ocean
and its main exports were pickles and lettuce. This is what we're supposed
to believe. Now the truth of the matter, obvious to anyone not committed
to the party line, is that Iraq has huge oil resources, maybe the second
in the world, mostly untapped, that it's right in the middle of the main
energy-producing region of the world and that taking control of Iraq will
strengthen enormously the US's control over the major energy resources
of the world.” (Chomsky, ‘On the Iraq Election,’ December
18, 2005; www.chomsky.info/interviews/20051218.htm)
But this is not a fit subject for mainstream discussion, not even in an
article focusing on “a desperate attempt to rewrite history“.
Curiously, an August-September, 2003 Gallup poll found that forty-three
per cent of Iraqis believed US and British forces invaded primarily "to
rob Iraq's oil". 5 per cent believed the United States invaded Iraq
"to assist the Iraqi people", and 1 per cent believed it was to
establish democracy. (Walter Pincus, ‘Skepticism About U.S. Deep,
Iraq Poll Shows,’ Washington Post, November 12, 2003)
This fits well with a January 2006 WPO which found that 80 per cent of
Iraqis believed that the US government planned to have permanent bases in
Iraq. A further 76 per cent said they thought the US would not withdraw
if asked to do so by the Iraqi government. (‘What the Iraqi Public
Wants,’ January 31, 2006; http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/
jan06/Iraq_Jan06_rpt.pdf)
An April 2007 WPO poll of Islamic countries found that an overwhelming
majority in Egypt (93%) said that maintaining “control over the oil
resources of the Middle East” was a goal of the United States (84%
definitely), as well as strong majorities in Morocco (82%), Indonesia (74%)
and Pakistan (68%). On average 79 per cent had this perception. (Muslim
Public Opinion on US Policy, Attacks on Civilians, and al Qaeda, April 24,
2007; http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/
pipa/pdf/apr07/START_Apr07_rpt.pdf)
None of this is allowed to exist for mainstream journalism - "mistakes"
and "bad apples" are recognised, but not facts that challenge
the fundamental benevolence of Western power.
SUGGESTED ACTION
The goal of Media Lens is to promote rationality, compassion and respect
for others. If you decide to write to journalists, we strongly urge you
to maintain a polite, non-aggressive and non-abusive tone.
Write to Mark Urban
Email: mark.urban@bbc.co.uk
Write to Peter Barron, editor of Newsnight
Email: peter.barron@bbc.co.uk
Write to Adrian Hamilton
Email: a.hamilton@independent.co.uk
Write to Simon Kelner, editor of the Independent
Email: s.kelner@independent.co.uk
Please send a copy of your emails to us
Email: editor@medialens.org
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